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Approved by: Ellen Kelly, Jr.

Date: 5/16/95

PAGE 01 SFCTC 24050 01 OF 09 191434Z
ACTION NO04-PA

INFO OCT-01 ANS-PA 10P1 *

0 151400Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM USDO7U SECRETARY IN RETIRING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5R31

S F C T C REPTON 01 OF 09 SFCTC 24050

NUMBER F.0.120691 RDS-3 6/14/81 (RETT7, R.G. H.)
TAGS: NYTP (HAIK, ALEXANDER H.), PH
SUBJECT: SECRETARY HAIK'S JUNE 14, 1981 RETIREAL WITH HUANG HUA

1. SFCDT - ENTIRE TXTE.

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY HAIK'S FIRSTHAND-53RAL
WITH CHINESE VICE PREM/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA
WAS DEVOTED TO AN EXPLANATION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO GLOBAL STRATEGY. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED
THIS POLICY AS BASED ON FOUR "PILLARS": (1) THE RECOGNITION
OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL DOMINATION AS THE
PRINCIPAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE; (2) REJUVENATION OF THE
TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND FRIENDSHIPS OF THE US TO
COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT; (3) US EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING
WORLD; (4) REINTEGRATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.

3. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-
AMERICAN COOPERATION TO THESE ENDS. HE NOTED SOVIET
DISTRESS AT THE REBUILING OF US MILITARY POWER, SOVIET
EFFORTS TO DIVIDE COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO THEM, AND THE
FAILURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AS THE MAJOR CHALLENGES
WE FACE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM HUANG, THE
SECRETARY DESCRIBED SOVIET EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN
PURPOSE. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID THE MAJOR FORUM WAS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WHERE THEY RETAINED CONTROL OF

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4.2.2 STRATEGIC CHARGE OBJECTS AND RESOURCES. A DYNAMICAL
QUALITATIVE PREDICTION IN THIS REGION AND CONTINENT IS STA.

4. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE US DEFENSE RULING
IN DETAIL. WUJIANG

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THE SECRETARY
DESCRIBED HIS SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS DURING HIS UNCLE
FART VISIT AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. HE OUTLINED HIS
EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION FORGEVING
INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT FOR SOUTA.

9. THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG JIDEEHUA ON THE DIVERGENT NATURE OF RECENT CHANGES IN RVN VIET PCI LEADS TO HANOI, AND ON THE REEN FWD & FIDM AND INTERVENATIONAL RESPONSE. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SOUTHWESTERN AND SOUTHERN - AS REFERRED TO THEIR RECENT MEETING.

7. PARTICIPATING IN THIS MEETING FOR THE U.S. WERE THE
SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILSONING, GEORGE PIAFFATIRES
GARDNER, GENERAL WALTERS, DR. DIRECTOR YUOT, VERSOS,
SHAWARD, TILLETT, ARMITAGE, GOLDGEORGE AND FREEMAN
PIOTETAKER, AND MR. CHANG, INTERPRETER. FOR THE
CHINESE SIDE, VICE PRESIDENT HUANG, VICE MINISTER OF TRADE
AMBASSADOR CHAI, DIRECTOR HAN YU, VERSOS, LI CHAOZHU,
TAN LONGCHUN, ZHANG XEYUAN, AND VARIOUS INTERPRETERS, AND
SIX NOTETAKERS, FOR SUMMERS.

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PAGE 01 SECTO 74050 09 OF 00 151332Z
ACTION NOV0-80

INFO 7CT-81 405-09 1441 6

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FM USCLL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5832

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DR. HUANG HUA WELCOMED THE SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY TO
THE YINJIANG ROOM AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE AT
4:30 P.M. JUNE 14, 1981.

DR. HUANG OPENED THE MEETING BY WARMLY WELCOMING THE
SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERN-
MENT. HE THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HAVING ACCEPTED
CHINA'S INVITATION TO VISIT BEIJING. HUANG NOTED THAT
THE SECRETARY HAD LAST VISITED BEIJING 9-1/2 YEARS
AGO. HE HAD RECENTLY ACQUAINTED WITH THE LATE PREMIER
ZHOU ENLAI. THE CHINESE CONSIDERED THE SECRETARY AN
OLD FRIEND. HUANG NOTED HE WAS VISITING CHINA IN A
PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TURMOIL. THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED HIS VISIT OF MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE AND VERY USEFUL. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT WAS
SHORT, HUANG SAID, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HOPED IT
WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

1d. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE ENJOYED RETURNING
TO BEIJING, WHICH WAS A PLACE FOR WHICH HE HAD GREAT
RESPECT AND AFFECTION. HE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF MANY
OLD FRIENDS ACROSS THE TABLE, ADDING THAT THIS RETURN
TO BEIJING HAD BEEN TOO LONG DELAYED. THE SECRETARY
SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE AWARE THAT ON THE U.S.
SIDE OF THE TABLE WERE MANY MEN WHO HAD WORKED FOR
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10. DODONAL CHANG'S RELATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF AS MUCH AS 18 YEARS. THE SIGNIFICANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS VISIT COULD BE SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT DOD TALKED WITH HIM HAD BEEN MENTIONED ONLY THREE DAYS BEFORE THE TRIP.

11. HUANG HUA AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONGRATULATED MR. CHANG ON HIS RETIRING.

12. THE SECRETARY DREW LAUGHTER WHEN HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT MR. CHANG WOULD ENJOY HIS VISIT TO BEIJING AS MUCH AS SHE MIGHT HAVE ENJOINED HIS WIFE WONG. THE SECRETARY THEN INTRODUCED THE MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, NOTING IN EACH CASE THE ROLE THEY HAD PLAYED OR COULD PLAY IN THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD US-CHINA RELATIONS. HE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING HIS PLEASURE AT THE NOMINATION OF AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AS US AMBASSADOR TO CHINA. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR HUMMEL HAD RECEIVED COURTESY IN PAKISTAN DURING A RECENT TOUR. POLICIES ARE SOMETIMES CONFUSED AND LESS THAN EFFECTIVE. IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD AMBASSADOR HUMMEL HAS ALWAYS A VOICE FOR TRUTH AND COURAGE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT HIS CONFIRMATION COULD BE CONCLUDED BY LATE JULY AND THAT HE MIGHT BE IN BEIJING BY THE END OF JULY OR EARLY AUGUST. REFERRING AGAIN TO HIS PARTY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS, WHICH HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DEMONSTRATED AN AMERICAN CONCERN FOR THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS. THIS WAS INTRADATIVE NOT ONLY AS GOOD NEIGHBORLINES BUT

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INFO OCT-81 478-00 10014

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FM USGCL SECRETARY IN RETIRE
TO SECRETARY KARHOG IMMEDIATE 5033

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15. THE SECRETARY BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES IS THAT Brought ABOUT BY THE LONG OVERDUE DISMISSAL OF THE DUST-VETNAM, PORT-INTERGATE SYNDROME. WHICH WAS DOMINATED U.S. POLICY THROUGH THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN ELECTED ON A PLATFORM DEDICATED TO THE REINVIGORATION OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD. THIS REINVIGORATION RESTED ON FOUR BASIC "PILLARS."

16. THE FIRST "PILLAR" WAS STRUCTURED ON THE CONVICTION OF THE PRESIDENT -- HELD STRONGLY IN EARLIER DAYS AND HELD BY HIM STRONGLY TODAY -- THAT THE GREATEST THREATS TO WORLD PEACE ARE THE SEARCH FOR HEREDITY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GROWING DANGER ARISING FROM THE SOVIET'S IMMENSE ACCUMULATION OF MILITARY POWER. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO INSTILL AN INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ON RECIPROCITY IN OUR OWN DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE DID REQUIRE MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, HE SAID, IN A FEW MOMENTS.

17. THE SECOND "PILLAR" OF PRESIDENT
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A VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS AT THE FOREIGN
MINISTER'S DISPOSAL. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
OUTLINE THE NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY THAT
PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INITIATED. AFTER A GENERAL
OVERVIEW OF THE GLBFS WE COULD TURN TO SPECIFIC REGIONS,
WORKING TOGETHER TO LEAVE HIS HAVING TO REVIEW &
MONITOR.

14. HUANG ENDORSED THIS ARRANGEMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD
APPROPRIATE A BRIEFING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOREIGN
POLICY; PARTICULARLY AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THE U.S.
VIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM A STRATEGIC
STANDPOINT AND HOW U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS MIGHT FIT
INTO U.S. STRATEGY. HE PROMISED TO AVOID QUESTIONS
AND MAKE COMMENTS AND NOT LET THE SECRETARY ENGAGE
IN A DIALOGUE. HUANG THEN INTRODUCED HIS OWN PARTY
TO THE SECRETARY.

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DESAVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE DEGENERATION AND STRENGTHENING OF BOTH THE TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND THE RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND THE ALIENATED COUNTRIES CONNECTED WITH THE THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM.

18. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A CHANGING WORLD. HE RECOGNIZED THAT IN A CHANGING WORLD IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. ESTABLISH JUST AND RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD. HE RECOMMENDED A CLEAR RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF MORE AND MORE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION LEADS ONLY TO DISAPPOINTMENT. IT BRINGS ARMAMENTS, BUT NOT GROWTH, NOT ECONOMIC BENEFITS, OR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OR MEDICAL PROGRESS. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE POLICIES TO COUNTER THE SPECTRE OF IMPERIALISM AND NEOPATRIOTISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED. OUR POLICY WOULD BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION THAT "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT" WAS AN IMPORTANT TERM, AND THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH TRULY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN A SENSITIVE AND FRIENDLY MANNER. THE SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTY OF "TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT," NOTING PRESTIGE OF PARTIES IS HAVING SAYS THAT THERE ARE "ONLY TWO TRUE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN THE WORLD," THE U.S. AND THE USSR.

BY FINALLY, THE FOURTH "OPTION" OF OUR POLICY, THE
REFUGEE STATUS, WAS THE PREFERENCE THAT WE CANNOT
DETERMINE WHICH OF OUR POLICIES ARE RELATEDLY PRODUCED
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

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20. IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF CHINESE POLICIES IN THIS MESSAGE, THE SECRETARY SAID, HE WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION THAT THE US-CHINA DIPLOMACY OF THE 1970'S WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC EVENT OF THAT DECADE, AS GREAT AS THE SIGNIFICANCE AND BEEN IN THE 1950'S, HOWEVER, IN THE 1980'S -- AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS DECADE -- STRONG U.S. CHINA RELATIONS TOOK ON EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT ONLY THROUGH MORE EFFECTIVE CONCERNING AND COORDINATION OF POLICIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON COULD WE HOPE TO COPE WITH THE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SEEKS WORLDWIDE DOMINITION.

21. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, MR. KOROVYATY, HE HAD DRAWN THREE IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION TODAY IS MOST DISTURBED BY THE PROSPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES AT

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ACTION 400508

INFO OCT-81 ANS-81 1001

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FM USUFL SECRETARY IN BEIJING
TO SECRETARY WARHOL IMMEDIATE 5#34

REF ID: AECT04 94 OF 29 SECTION 14008

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1. ONG LAST IS DEDICATED TO REBUILDING IN MILITARY
STRENGTH. SOVIET POLICIES WILL THEREFORE SEEK TO
REVERSE THIS NEW AMERICAN RESOLVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS
OBJECTIVE, THEY WILL USE A VARIETY OF MEANS -- IN-
CLUDING ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND PEACE OFFERINGS --
DESIGNED TO BREAK UP THE UNUSUAL HISTORICAL CONSENSUS
WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE CONGRESS, AND THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAD ACHIEVED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
20 YEARS. THE UNANTHORIC AMERICAN VIEW WAS THAT IT
WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REBUILD ITS
MILITARY STRENGTH.

22. THE SECOND CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
INTENDED TO DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO BREAK
UP ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THOSE WHO COULD
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AGAINST SOVIET IMPERIALISM.
IN EUROPE THEY INTENDED TO POSSE AS ADVOCATES OF
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT; ELSEWHERE THEY WOULD PURSUE
ANY TACTIC THEY COULD. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT
THIS HAD, ON THE VERY DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL IN BEIJING
ATTACKED HIS VISIT TO CHINA IN WHAT HE SARCASMICALLY
TERMED "VERY SUBTLE TERMS."

23. A THIRD CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS
RECOGNIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL FAILURE OF THEIR

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SYSTEM OF MASSPSH/LEVIATHAN AND THE SOVIET MODEL. IN AGRICULTURE AND THE ECONOMY, IN FEDERAL LEVEL POL-
ICY, IN THE AREA OF DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY AND IN THE
NON-RESIDENT POPULATION AND CENTRIFUGAL PRESSURES IN
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, SUCH AS THOSE OF 1965 IN POLAND,
SOVIET LEADERS HAVE FORCED TO SEEK THEUSLUER IN
OPERATING UNDER A DEADLINE. IN OUR VIEW THESE CHANGES
WILL THE SOVIET MODEL, NOT LESEA, DANGEROUS, DISEASER
AT PRESENT WITH IMPROVED MILITARY STRENGTH, THEY
WILL BE TEMPTED TO TAKE RISKS ARMED IN ORDER TO
DIVERT INTERNAL ATTENTION FROM THEIR FAILURES.

24. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE DEAGAR ADMIRALTY-
TRAITOR HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR THESE REASONS THE CO-
VERGENCE OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE
STRATEGIC SENSE HAD TAKEN ON UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE
TO THE PERIOD AHEAD.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO TALK ABOUT U.S. PLANS TO STRENGTHEN OUR MILITARY DEFENSES IF THE FEDERAL MINISTER ASKED.

20. HUANG SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW
REMARKS.

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FM USUFL SECRETARY IN REYKJAVIK
TO SECRETARY WARHOG IMMEDIATE 5039

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29. THE SECRETARY SAID, FIRST OF ALL, WITH
RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USSR HAD A
GLOBAL STRATEGY, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE POST-WWII
PERIOD CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE IN REARM OF
GLOBAL HEGEMONY. THIS REARM HAD IMMOBILICAL OVER-
TONES, BUT IN PRACTICE THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO
USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND TO SEEK ANY TARGET TO APPROP-
PRIATE TO EXPAND THEIR PRESENCE IN THE WORLD. HE
HAD SEEN THIS IN A HOST OF INSTANCES. IN EUROPE
THE SOVIETS SEEK TO NEUTRALIZE OR FINLANDIZE THE
COUNTRIES OF THE AREA. IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD THE
SOVIETS ACTED THROUGH PROXYES AND ATTEMPTED TO ER-
ODUCT STATE-STATE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THOSE WORLD
COUNTRIES. THEY FOUND MANY WHO WERE WILLING TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE FROM THEM. IN THE WORLD AT LARGE THE
SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO SPLIT ALL WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO
JOIN TOGETHER AGAINST THEM. THE RUSSIAN
STRATEGY, THEREFORE, WAS TO FRAGMENT AND NEUTRALIZE
WESTERN EUROPE, AND PROOF THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES,
BUT THEY SAW THEIR GREATEST OPPORTUNITY PERHAPS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. THEY PURSUED THIS INTEREST NOT ONLY
IN TERMS OF EXPANDED INFLUENCE BUT ALSO THROUGH
EFFORTS TO SEIZE KEY STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS FROM
WHICH THEY COULD CONTROL COMMERCE, ENERGY RESOURCES OR
THE FLOW OF RAW MATERIALS. IN THIS WAY THEY HOPED

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THEY COULD STRANGLE THE WESTERN TRADITIONALIZED
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT HAVING TO OPENLY FIGHT THEM.

30. THEIR KEY STRATEGY -- WHICH THEY HAD USED WITH
SOME SUCCESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD -- WAS TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF LOCAL INJUSTICE AND THROTTLE THROUGH
CURRENTLY, TERRORISM, AND TERRORIZATION. THEY SOUGHT
BY THIS WAY TO CREATE A CORRELATION OF FORCES WHICH
WOULD JUSTIFY SOVIET INTERVENTION EITHER BY THE SHIPPIN
OF ARMOYS, BY THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES OR EVEN
AS IN AFGHANISTAN -- BY THE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET FORCES
THEMSELVES. WE HAVE SEEN THIS PATTERN, THE SECRETARY
SAID, IN ANGOLA, IN ETHIOPIA, IN SOUTH YEMEN, IN NORTH
YEMEN, IN AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, AND EL SALVADOR. IN
EL SALVADOR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HOPED TO REAP
THIS MONUMENTAL TRAD GUATEMALA -- OR EVEN PANAMA OR MEXICO
IF THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE LEFT UNATTEMPTED.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT AMONG THE MOST URGENT TASKS
WE FACE WHICH HE HAS NOT PERFORMED YET AT ALL, TIME IN
THE PAST, WAS TO DEAL WITH DEVELOPING STATES IN A WAY
THAT HELPED THEM RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES OF QUESTION INFLUENCE
AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN TRUE NEUTRALITY AND ASSOCIA-
TION WITH THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, FROM WHICH
THEY COULD ENJOY A MORE ORGANIC CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR
DEVELOPMENT THAN COULD BE MADE BY THE SOVIET. THE
SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS IS THE APPROACH THE UNITED
STATES HAS TAKEN IN AFRICA. HEURE, IF WEDE THE ARGUMENT
AND CONTRIBUTOR TO ZAMBIA, AND A GENEROUS CONTRIBUTOR
TO THE RECENT AFRICAN REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN
GENERAL. HE ADOPT WORKING TO ACHIEVE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE,
INTERSTITIAL RECOGNITION AND STARTLETT THE NEW NATIONS UNDED
TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT MAKE IT A SOVIET COLONIALIST/LEGITIMATE

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PARAGUAY. THIS WAR ALSO WITH APPROACH TO CENTRAL
AMERICA. OUR EFFORTS THERE WERE NOT EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY BUT

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TO SECRETARY WARHOC IMMEDIATE 5R3R

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RATHER DEPENDED UPON THE ELABORATION OF A NEW REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN COORDINATED WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
IN THE NEGLON AND BENEFITTING FROM CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
THE WEST EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE.

32. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY
OF ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, GIVEN HISSTORIC MISTAKES
NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES BUT BY THE WESTERN
INDUSTRIAL POLARS AS A WHOLE. THESE OBJECTIVES MUST
BE PURSUED, HE SAID, WITH GREAT INCERITTY AND DEDICATED-
NESS. HE MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE COGNIZANT THAT
OUR OBJECTIVES COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED EXCLUSIVELY BY
"NATION-BUILDING" APPROACHES. HE MUST RECOGNIZE THE
SOURCES OF UNREST AND TURMOIL IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
AND TAKE ACTIONS WHICH REACH DIRECTLY TO THE SOURCES OF
SUCH TURMOIL. IN THE WESTERNHEMISPHERE HE WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT CUBA AS SUCH A SOURCE. IN NORTH AFRICA
HE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT LIBYA. BUT IN A GLOBAL SENSE
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAJOR SOURCE OF SUCH DIFFICULTY
WAS THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

33. HUANG ASKED IF THE SECRETARY WOULD CARE TO DESCRIBE
HIS VIEW OF THE FUTURE OF SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY. THAT
IS, ON WHICH AREAS DID THE SOVIET UNION CONCENTRATE ITS
EFFORTS?

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14. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE WAS STRATEGIC PRESSURE BY THE SOVIETS ON MANY FRONTS. WHERE THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED STRONG OPPOSITION THEY WOULD SHIFT TO WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED SOFTNESS OR WHERE FORWARD PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY SOUGHT TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN EUROPE THROUGH PEACE OFFENSIVES AND BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURAL APPETITE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLE FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND IRIS CONTROL. IN THE THIRD WORLD THEY ALSO ATTEMPTED TO MOVE ON A BROAD FRONT. THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION AND STRATEGIC TRADE PORTS IN AS FAR THAT CONTAINED MAJOR ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES. IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEIR EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, NORTHEAST ASIA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA WERE THOROUGH. THEY CLEARLY REGARDED IT AS EXTREMELY THOROUGH TO CONTROL THE SEA LANE CONNECTING THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS. THE STRATEGY OF MILITARY AND OTHER TYPES OF COMMUNICATION ACROSS THE WORLD. IT WAS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HE HAD TO VIEW THEIR BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM. THEY HAD CONSTRUCTED A SMALL INTELLIGENCE BASE THERE, SECOND IN SIZE ONLY TO THEIR FACILITY IN CHINA.

15. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR JABRAYILOV, THE SECRETARY NOTED, HE HAD RECEIVED A DILSTAN DREDGE-OPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, I.E., THE REGION FROM AFGHANISTAN THROUGH IRAN TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS WAS CLEARLY A TARGET OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ONE MUST NEVER ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN ONLY TO ESTABLISH A SAFETY BUFFER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEIR PLACEMENT MUST BE VIEWED AS PREDICATED ON NEIGHBORING'S NEEDS IN KEY ENERGY-PRODUCTING AREAS OF THE WORLD.
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AND ON THE COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES THROUGH WHICH ENERGY IS TRANSPORTED. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT, IF THE STATE OF TREATY IN THE CHINESE, OUR EXPERTS COULD BE DEPLOYED TO MAKE SIDE TALKS WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY ON ASPECTS OF OUR OWN MILITARY PLANNING AND TO OBTAIN THE UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY. GENERAL VISTEN WROTE PRIVATELY OF THE LATTER.

MR. RUBIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES
COULD ARRANGE THE FORMER. HAVING DETERMINED THAT SUCH
ARRANGEMENTS COULD AND SHOULD BE MADE.

36. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT REPORTS HIS FEDERAL DEFENCE
CULTURES, WHICH HE SHARED WITH THE REVENUE AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES ALIKE, THIS YEAR OF 1966 ADDING 32 MILLION
DOLLARS TO THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL DEFENCE BUDGET.
OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS HE WOULD ADD 200 MILLION
DOLLARS OVER AND ABOVE FEDERAL DEFENCE BUDGET. THESE ADDITIONAL
DEFENCE SPENDING GO TO THE NATIONAL AND CENTRAL STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR POWER AND ALSO, MORE IMPORTANTLY OUR NAVAL AND
GROUND FORCES.

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37'. IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WE INTENDED TO PUT IN A NEW STRATEGIC RONKH AND PUT IT INTO PRODUCTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD USE 3,000 LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL AS NEW LAND-BASED STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS. WE WERE PLANNING AND DEVELOPING MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE AND NAVY MISSILES TO THE UK. WE INTENDED TO FINANCE AND TREAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AS WELL.

38. IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND
FORCES: WE ARE BUILDING A NEW TANK AND ARVDO FIGHTING
VEHICLES WHICH WE WOULD PRODUCE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
WE WILL INTRODUCE A NEW ROCKET LAUNCHER AND ASSAULT
HELICOPTER, AS WELL AS THREE NEW ANTIT-AIRCRAFT MISSILES.
WE PLANNED TO STEP UP PRODUCTION FOR FIVE NEW FIGHTER-
BOMBER TYPES. WE ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE PRODUCTION
OF OUR RESERVE MATERIAL TO ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO RESIST
BUT ONLY, IF NECESSARY, IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WESTERN
EUROPE.

19. DEOMAPC TWO MOST SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP WOULD BE IN
NAVAL POLICE, OF WHICH 800 150 ENTR TO THE AREA AND IN
TWO DIVISIONS, PROVIDING THE NAVY TO 800 ENTR. OF WHICH
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CARRIER TASK GROUPS FROM 12
TO 1, WHILE ADJUSTING NAVY COURSE VESSELS TO TWO FLEET.

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INCLUDING THOSE ON TWO REFORGERED BATTLESHIPS, ADDING
SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR NAVY'S LONG RANGE AND FIRE SUPPORT
CAPABILITIES.

42. SECRETARY SATO

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42. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED AT THE
EXAMPLES CITED BY THE VICE PREMIER, ADDING THAT HE WAS
ONLY SURPRISED THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE LEAVING
OF THE US CRIMINAL CHARGE AGAINST THE USSR. (THIS GAVE
1,000,000 POUNDS OF PAPER TO THE CHINESE.) HE
SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE WHOLE EAST WAS THE
MOST DANGEROUS AREA IN THE WORLD AT PRESENT. HE WISHED

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TO SAY A WORD AGAIN ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ACTUALLY DOING IN THE REGION: AS OPPOSED TO WHAT WE ARE PERCEIVED TO BE DOING.

43. OUR POLICY RESTS ON A RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE AREA, INCLUDING PURSUAN WILTINGNESS TO MOVE INTO THE HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN IRAN, TO EXPLOIT THEIR POSITION IN IRAN TO MOVE INTO NORTH YEMEN AND TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SAUDIS AND OMAN FOR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE NEW TREATY THEY HAD SIGNED WITH SYRIA, AND THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY EXPLAINED ARAB-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES. WE ADD ATTENTION TO THEIR SUPPORT FOR LIBYA, AND THEIR EFFORT TO ESTABLISH WHAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT TERMED "BELTS" OF CONTROL FROM NORTH AFRICA ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST.

44. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HIS FIRST TRIP ARRIVED HAD BEEN TO DEAL WITH THE COOPERATIVE'S HUANG AND HAISEN. HE HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: (1) CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT; AND (2) STRENGTHEN ATTITUDES WITH RESPECT TO THE DANGER FROM THE SOVIETS AMONG THE ARAB STATES.

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45. NEARSHAPED REPORTS NOTWITHSTANDING, HE HAD MADE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. HE HAD ESTABLISHED A COMPLETE NEW
SET OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. S-37 2811 47719
IN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF SAUDI AIR TO PAKISTAN, SUDAN
AND ROMANIA, AS WELL AS SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN EFFORTS TO
FOURISH THE LITHUANIAN INVASION OF CHAD. HE HAD REVOLVED THE
ISOLATED ATTITUDE OF JORDAN. HE HAD EVEN BEGUN A
TENTATIVE, EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH IRAQ. ALL THESE INITIATIVES AND STEPS HAD BEEN
SET BACK BY THE ISRAELI RATO ON THE TRADITIONALISMS.
THE US HAD ISSUED AN UNPRECEDENTED CONDEMNATION OF
ISRAEL, AND SUSPENDED THE SHIPMENT OF F-16'S TO IT.

46. OUR GREATER OFFICE OF PROPOSITION CONTINUED TO BE
WITH EGYPT. THE EGYPTIANS WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH
US
THE PEACE PROCESS. THEY WILL COOPERATE STRATEGICALLY,
PROVIDING ALL THE MILITARY FACILITIES WE NEED TO WORK
AGAINST THE SOVIET AND DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF QHODHAFI
AND HIS ACTIVITIES IN NORTH AFRICA.

47. WITH RESPECT TO YAHIRIA, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT WORKING
EXCLUSIVELY WITH UN RESOLUTION 435 WOULD ONLY RESULT IN
THE LONG-TERM, IN DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE CALIFIED "FRONT LINE" STATES. HENCE WE TO CONTINUE
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THE COLD WAR ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED POLICIES, IF WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICT BETWEEN BLACK ACTIVISTS AND SOUTHERN WHITE MINORITIES. THIS WOULD OFFER GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET INTERVENTIONISM.

48. "S EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH PREFECTURE IN PODEGUA
ARE DESIGNED TO ELICIT FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE
FLEXIBILITY THEY MUST EXERCISE TO GAIN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE.

ENCE FOR NAVIRIA. WE ALSO INTEND IN THIS CONNECTION TO
ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA.
WE WERE NOT HAVING NAVIRIA INDEPENDENCE CONDITIONAL ON
CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT, IN THE
FINAL STAGES, WE COULD BRING ABOUT SUCH WITHDRAWAL.

49. AND BASIC AGREEMENT WAS CONSISTENT WITH
RESOLUTION 475, BUT MORE COMPREHENSIVE, INCLUDING
MINIMAL GUARANTEES FOR MINORITY, GENUINE SELF-
DETERMINATION FOR THE MAURITIAN GOVERNMENT, AND TRUE
NON-ALIGNMENT FOR THE COUNTRY. THERE COULD BE NO PEACE
WITHOUT BOTH AFRICAN COOPERATION. ONLY THE US COULD
MEDIATE SUCH COOPERATION. TO DO THIS IT WAS ESSENTIAL
THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE US STANDS
BY THEM THEIR CONCERNES AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS.

RE: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD JUST LEFT ZURICH. THERE
WAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD MADE SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEADERS THERE.

51. HUANG NOTED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, ONLY 20 MINUTES BEFORE THE SECRETARY HAD TO RETURN TO HIS GUEST HOUSE AND CHANGE FOR DINNER.

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92. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK BRIEFLY
ABOUT POLAND. THE SITUATION THERE WAS EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS AND THE LIVELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION WAS
NOW STRONGER THAN IN THE RECENT PAST. THE STRUGGLE
HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN BETWEEN THE SOLIDARITY LABOR MOVEMENT
AND THE POLISH PARTY. IT WAS NOW BETWEEN THE POLISH
PARTY ITSELF AND THE RUSSIAN PARTY. THERE WOULD BE
A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE WEEKS AHEAD UNTIL
THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS IN JULY. THE SECRETARY
INVITED FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG TO COMMENT ON THE
POLISH SITUATION.

43. HUANG SAT

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97. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE AGREED SOLELY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT HE DO IN FACT HAVE UNUSUAL HUMOR WITHIN NATO ON THE POLISH SITUATION. NOTING HUANG'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND YEMENIA, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD REALLY LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER DAY IN WHICH TO DISCUSS THOSE ISSUES BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH. THE UNITED STATES NEEDED CHINESE HELP TO ENSURE A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THOSE QUESTIONS. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING MEETING BE DEVOTED TO A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE AFGHAN AND KAMPUCHEAN SITUATIONS.

98. HUANG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PRACTICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ON JUNE 19 BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS.

THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT 6:30 P.M.
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